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0. Abstract
Dispositional	essentialism	is	a	non-Humean	view	about	the	essences	
of	 certain	 fundamental	 or	 natural	 properties	 that	 looms	 large	 in	 re-
cent	metaphysics	(of	science),	not	least	because	it	promises	to	explain	
neatly	the	natural	modalities	such	as	laws	of	nature,	counterfactuals,	
causation	and	chance.	In	the	current	paper,	however,	several	consid-
erations	are	presented	that	indicate	a	serious	tension	between	its	es-
sentialist	core	thesis	and	natural	“metaphysical”	interpretations	of	its	
central	explanatory	claims.
1. Introduction
1.1 Ambitious dispositional essentialism
Dispositional	 essentialism	 is	 the	 thesis	 that	 “[a]t	 least	 some	 sparse,	
fundamental	properties	have	dispositional	essences”	(Bird	2007:	45).1 
Furthermore,	such	potencies	or	powerful	properties	are	supposed	to	
“provide	natural	necessity	and	possibility	and	are	fit	to	be	truthmakers	
of	modal	truths.	They	are	not	the	truthmakers	of	all	modal	truths:	only	
the	natural	or	de re	modal	truths”	(Mumford	2004:	170).	Accordingly,	
this	“raises	the	hope	that	dispositionalism	can	provide	a	unified	meta-
physical	grounding	for	natural	modalities	in	general	that	may	serve	as	
an	alternative	to	Humeanism”	(Choi	and	Fara	2012:	section	3).
Let	us	call	the	claim	that	the	natural	modalities	are	grounded	in	the	
(natures	of)	potencies	ambitious dispositional essentialism	(ADE).2 
1.2 The ambitious dispositionalists’ vision
Before	 we	 examine	 the	 ambitious	 dispositionalist’s	 package,	 let	 us	
quickly	mention	two	reasons	why	ADE	might	be	regarded	as	superior	
to	several	rival	metaphysical	accounts	of	natural	modalities.
1.	 Since	it	might	be	regarded	as	an	empirical	question	whether	there	is	a	funda-
mental	level	at	all,	it	may	be	favourable	to	formulate	dispositional	essential-
ism	as	a	thesis	about	fairly	natural	properties.	For	reasons	of	convenience,	we	
follow	Bird	 (2007)	 and	use	 the	 label	 “potency”	 for	 fundamental	or	natural	
dispositional	properties.
2.	 For	less	ambitious	versions	of	dispositional	essentialism,	cf.	section	4.1	of	the	
current	paper.
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tive	laws	of	a	sui generis	ontological	kind,7	brute	natural	necessity	or	
fundamental	subjunctive	facts8	are	rendered	superfluous.
Accordingly,	ADE	promises	an	account	of	natural	modalities	 that	
is	more	 “local”	 or	 “direct”	 than	 the	Neo-Humean	approach,	 enables	
explanations	seemingly	unavailable	on	the	latter	doctrine	and	is	at	the	
same	time	metaphysically	more	parsimonious	than	several	other	non-
Humean	views.	Consequently,	the	tenability	of	ADE	would	be	strong	
metaphysical	evidence	in	favour	of	a	dispositionalist	metaphysics	not	
based	on	controversial	epistemic	or	semantic	assumptions	that	have	
been	frequently	utilized	to	motivate	dispositionalism.9
1.3 Ways of contesting ADE
The	main	purpose	of	the	current	paper	is	to	challenge	the	tenability	
of	ADE	in	a	novel	way.	Usually	the	attacks	on	ADE	come	in	two	dif-
ferent	guises:	
Since,	obviously,	ADE	incorporates	dispositional	essentialism,	ADE	
is	susceptible	to	attacks	on	its	essentialist	core	claim.	For	instance,	it	
has	been	argued	that	pandispositionalism	plus	property	structuralism,	
i. e.,	the	view	that	the	nature	of	every	fundamental	property	is	exhausted 
by	its	dispositionality,	is	incoherent,	since	the	attempt	to	individuate	
properties	exclusively	via	(dispositional)	relations	to	other	properties	
leads	into	vicious	regresses	or	circles.10	A	second	line	of	criticism	con-
tests	the	grounding	claim.	For	instance,	it	has	been	argued	that	various	
laws	(e. g.,	functional	laws,	the	principle	of	least	action,	symmetry	laws	
and	conservation	laws)	seem	not	to	be	grounded	in	the	(natures	of)	
potencies.11	Moreover,	Eagle	 (2009)	has	argued	 that	 certain	counter-
7.	 Cf.	Maudlin	(2007)	and	Carroll	(1987)	for	the	view	that	laws	are	primitive
8.	 Cf.	Lange	(2009)	for	primitivism	about	subjunctive	facts.
9.	 Cf.	Hawthorne	(2001)	for	a	critical	discussion	of	certain	epistemic	and	seman-
tic	arguments	for	dispositionalism.
10.	Cf.	Armstrong	(1997:	80)	and	Lowe	(2010)	for	variations	of	this	objection.
11.	 For	instance,	Katzav	(2004)	argues	that	dispositionalism	cannot	account	for	
the	principle	of	least	action,	and	Vetter	(2012)	discusses	functional	laws	as	a	
problem	for	Bird’s	version	of	dispositional	essentialism.	Corry	(2011)	in	turn	
First,	 according	 to	 ADE,	 (the	 nature	 of)	 a	 fundamental	 property	
seems	to	fully	ground	certain	natural	modalities,	and	so,	contrary	to	
David	Lewis’	version	of	Neo-Humeanism,	there	is	no	need	to	invoke	
the	 entire	 4D-mosaic	 of	 property	 instantiations	 and	 the	 regularities	
therein	to	explain	these	modalities.3	For	instance,	the	fact	that	it	lies	in	
the	nature	of	a	determinate	mass	to	exert	a	certain	gravitational	force	
on	other	masses,	when	at	a	certain	distance	from	them,	seems	to	fully	
ground	the	law	that	masses	exert	certain	gravitational	forces	on	other	
masses,	when	they	are	at	a	certain	distance	from	each	other.4	Corre-
spondingly,	ADE	seems	to	make	room	for	the	possibility	that,	in	con-
trast	to	Neo-Humeanism,	the	pattern	of	property	instantiations	itself	is	
explained	by	(the	modalities	pertaining	to)	the	natures	of	potencies.5 
Second,	since	facts	about	(the	natures	of)	first-order	potencies	are	
sufficient	 to	 ground	 laws,	natural	necessity,	 counterfactuals	 and	 the	
like,	there	seems	to	be	no	need	to	postulate	any	additional	primitive	
(non-Humean)	 facts	 to	 account	 for	 these	natural	modalities.	 So,	 for	
example,	 instantiations	of	 irreducible	 second-order	 relations,6	primi-
3.	 Cf.	Lewis	(1973)	for	a	Neo-Humean	account	of	laws	and	counterfactuals.	The	
central	tenet	of	Lewis’	Neo-Humeanism	is	Humean	Supervenience,	“the	the-
sis	that	the	whole	truth	about	a	world	like	ours	supervenes	on	the	spatiotem-
poral	distribution	of	local	qualities”	(Lewis	1994:	473).	Accordingly,	also	the	
laws	and	the	remaining	natural	modalities	hold	in	virtue	of	the	entire	mosaic	
of	 instantiations	of	natural	properties:	 “Like	any	regularity	 theory,	 the	best-
system	analysis	 says	 that	 laws	hold	 in	virtue	of	patterns	 spread	over	all	of	
space	and	time”	(Lewis	1994:	479).
4.	 Cf.	Bird	(2007:	3.1.2)	 for	 the	derivation	of	a	 law	from	the	 fact	 that	a	single	
potency	has	a	dispositional	nature.
	 	 However,	dispositional	essentialism	seems	to	be	also	compatible	with	a	
less	direct	connection	between	potencies	and	laws.	Cf.	Demarest	(forthcom-
ing)	for	an	attempt	to	couple	dispositionalism	with	a	best-systems	account	
of	laws.
5.	 For	instance,	Bird	(2007:	ch.	4.3.2)	takes	this	as	a	significant	advantage	of	dis-
positionalist	over	Neo-Humean	accounts	of	laws.	However,	cf.	Loewer	(2012),	
Hicks	and	van	Elswyk	(forthcoming)	and	Miller	(forthcoming)	for	defences	of	
the	claim	that	Neo-Humean	laws	can	explain.	I	want	to	thank	an	anonymous	
referee	for	this	journal	for	drawing	my	attention	to	these	recent	publications	
on	behalf	of	Neo-Humean	conceptions	of	laws.
6.	 Cf.	Armstrong	(1983:	Part	II),	Dretske	(1977)	and	Tooley	(1977)	for	slightly	dif-
ferent	versions	of	a	second-order-necessitation	theory	of	laws.
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closer	 look	at	 the	 explanatory	 claim(s)	 associated	with	ADE.	 In	 sec-
tion	3	we	examine	arguments	to	the	conclusion	that	 the	essentialist	
core	 is	 incompatible	with	various	versions	of	 the	explanatory	claim.	
If	 conclusive,	 these	 arguments	 show	 that	 dispositional	 essentialism	
is	in	principle	unsuited	to	deliver	a	unified	grounding	of	the	natural	
modalities,	i. e.,	that	ADE	is	untenable.	In	section	4,	assuming	that	the	
arguments	presented	 in	 the	previous	 section	are	 sound,	 several	 ver-
sions	of	dispositionalism	are	examined	 that	drop	or	modify	 at	 least	
one	of	ADE’s	components.	Section	5	finally	summarizes	the	results	of	
the	present	discussion.
2.  A precisification of ADE’s core claims 
In	this	section	we	want	to	examine	the	essentialist	core,	i. e.,	disposi-
tional	essentialism,	and	the	explanatory	thesis	associated	with	ADE	in	
more	detail.	
2.1 The modal account of dispositionality 
Dispositional	essentialism	is	a	compound	of	two	theses.	The	first	is	an-
ti-quidditism	about	fundamental	properties,	i. e.,	the	thesis	that	at	least	
some	natural	properties	have	non-trivial	essences,	and	the	second	is	a	
claim	about	the	“content”	of	these	property-essences,	namely	that	the	
content	consists	of	 the	property’s	dispositionality.	The	question	 that	
presents	itself	is	what	exactly	a	dispositional	essence	is.
According	to	Bird	(2007),	the	real	or	constitutive	essence	of	a	natu-
ral	dispositional	property	includes	(or	is	even	exhausted	by)	its	dispo-
sitional	character:
Essentially	dispositional	properties	are	ones	that	have	the	
same	dispositional	character	 in	all	possible	worlds;	that	
character	 is	 the	property’s	real	rather	 than	merely	nomi-
nal	essence.	(Bird	2007:	44)
Since	Bird	endorses	a	stimulus-response	model	of	dispositions,	more	
accurately,	the	dispositional	character	is	described	as	follows:	
factuals	cannot	be	grounded	in	a	disposition	and	Schrenk	(2010)	has	
called	into	question	that	a	potency	is	appropriate	to	yield	(monotonic)	
necessity	in	nature.
There	 have	 been	 several	 dispositionalist	 responses	 to	 both	 of	
these	worries.	While	Bird	 (2007:	 138–146)	 suggests	a	graph-theoret-
ic	vindication	of	 the	regress	objection	against	dispositional	monism,	
others	 have	 pointed	 out	 that	 more	 “moderate”	 versions	 of	 disposi-
tionalism	—	such	 as	 dualism,	 the	 double-sided	 view	 or	 the	 identity	
view	—	are	 not	 affected	 by	 regress-type	 problems.12	 Regarding	 the	
second	 line	 of	 attack,	 some	dispositionalists	 suggest	 accounting	 for	
the	“missing”	natural	modalities	in	a	broader	essentialist	framework,13 
whereas	 others	 take	 a	more	 deflationist	 attitude	 towards	 them	 and	
deny	that	a	metaphysical	account	has	to	be	given	at	all.14
Instead	of	joining	the	discussion	of	these	important	but	piecemeal	
attacks	on	ADE,	we	take	one	step	back	and	question	whether	ADE’s	
essentialist	core	claim	is	even	compatible	with	its	grounding	claim.	If	
it	turns	out	that	already	the	two	core	components	of	ADE	pull	in	differ-
ent	directions,	this	amounts	to	a	very	general	and	principled	challenge	
not	based	on	assumptions	possibly	inessential	to	ADE	or	answerable	
by	adding	auxiliary	theoretical	machinery.	Moreover,	the	discussion	of	
this	challenge	clarifies	what	a	dispositional	metaphysics	in	principle	
can	accomplish.
1.4 The roadmap
The	structure	of	the	present	paper	is	as	follows:	In	the	next	section,	we	
first	state	the	essentialist	core	of	ADE	more	carefully	and	then	take	a	
criticizes	Bird’s	account	of	laws	based	on	the	observation	that	the	manifesta-
tion	of	potencies	can	be	interfered	with.
12.	 Dualism	is	advocated	in	Ellis	(2002)	and	Molnar	(2003).	The	identity	view	is	
presented	in	Heil	(2003:	111)	and	has	been	developed	more	recently	in	Jacobs	
(2011)	and	Tugby	(2012).
13.	 Cf.	Bigelow	et	al.	(1992)	and	Ellis	(2005)	for	two	versions	of	this	answer.
14.	 For	instance,	according	to	Bird	(2007:	214),	conservation	and	symmetry	laws	
are	pseudo-laws.	For	a	critique	of	this	move,	cf.	Lange	(2012).
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such	that	they	would	M	if	they	were	S.17	Using	the	sentence	operator	
ƐF,	which	is	the	formal	expression	for	‘it	lies	in	the	nature	of	F	that’	or	
‘it	is	part	of	the	essence	of	F	that’,	this	can	be	stated	as	‘Ɛ
P
	(Px → (Sx □→ 
Mx))’.	18
(Notice	that	ƐF	(Fx → Gx)	is	to	be	understood	as	an	objectual	es-
sentialist	statement	about	the	property	F	and	not	about	the	natures	
of	the	things	that	have	it.19	Since,	e. g.,	a	particular	negatively	charged	
object	q	need	not	be	essentially	so	charged,	 it	seems	wrong	to	say	
that	 it	 is	 true	 in	virtue	of	 the	nature	of	q	 that	 it	would	 repel	other	
negative	charges	if	 it	were	in	the	proximity	of	them.20	Furthermore,	
according	 to	 Fine	 (1994),	 essence	 is	 primitive.	 Although	we	 agree	
with	Fine	that	essence	cannot	be	adequately	framed	in	modal	terms,	
ƐF	is	intended	to	be	neutral	on	this	issue.	This	neutrality	is	a	welcome	
feature,	 since	a	primitivist	non-modal	account	of	essence	does	not	
seem	to	be	mandatory	for	ADE.21	For	instance,	although	Bird	(2007:	
149)	seems	to	sympathise	with	Fine’s	criticism	of	a	purely	modal	ac-
count	of	essence,	formally	he	expresses	the	claim	that	potencies	are	
essentially	dispositional	in	modal	terms,	i. e.,	as	‘□	(Px → D
(S,M)
x)’	or	
‘□	(Px	→ (Sx □→	Mx))’,	respectively.)
However,	it	should	be	noted	that	if	it	is	held	that	dispositional	es-
sences	 “contain”	 natural	 modalities,	 subjunctive	 or	 counterfactual	
conditionals	 are	not	 the	only	 candidates.22	 In	 causal	 versions	of	dis-
positional	essentialism	the	natural	modality	in	question	is	of	a	causal	
kind	instead,	and	in	nomic	versions	of	dispositional	essentialism	the	
17.	 It	is	assumed	here	that	P	is	a	non-probabilistic	or	“surefire”	potency.
18.	 In	the	present	paper,	we	use	an	operator	 formulation	of	essentialist	claims	
mainly	for	reasons	of	convenience.	
19.	 For	instance,	in	Fine	(1995a,	2000)	the	sentence	operator	□F	is	to	be	under-
stood	as	‘it	is	true	in	virtue	of	the	nature	of	the	objects	which	F	that’.
20.	This	problem	might	be	avoided	if	instead	q-qua-being negatively charged	is	con-
sidered.	Cf.	Lewis	(2003)	for	more	on	“qua-objects”.
21.	 However,	Yates	(2013)	has	argued	for	a	version	of	dispositional	essentialism	
employing	a	Finean	conception	of	essence.
22.	 	Cf.	section	4.2	for	non-modal	conceptions	of	dispositional	essences.
Thus,	according	to	dispositional	essentialism,	the	real	es-
sence	of	 some	potency	P	 includes	a	disposition	 to	give	
some	 particular	 characteristic	 manifestation	 M	 in	 re-
sponse	 to	 a	 characteristic	 stimulus	 S.	Hence,	 in	 all	 pos-
sible	worlds,	any	object	 that	possesses	P	 is	disposed	 to	
yield	M	in	response	to	S:
(DE
P
)	 	□	(Px → D
(S,M)
x).		(Bird	2007:	45)
Finally,	Bird	equates	this	essential	dispositional	character	with	certain	
subjunctive	or	counterfactual	conditionals:
The	 straightforward	 dispositional	 essentialist	 account	
of	 laws	equates	dispositional	 character	and	subjunctive	
conditionals,	as	is	found	in	the	conditional	analysis	of	dis-
positions.	(Bird	2007:	64)
Note,	however,	that	according	to	Bird	(2007:	50–64),	this	holds	just	for	
fundamental	potencies.	For	non-fundamental	potencies,	the	subjunc-
tive	has	to	be	modified	in	a	certain	way.15
Putting	these	remarks	together	and	substituting	a	subjunctive	con-
ditional	for	D
(S,M)
x,	we	get	the	result	that	certain	subjunctive	or	coun-
terfactual	conditionals	pertain	to	the	essences	of	potencies.16	Since	the	
subjunctives	make	up	the	“content”	of	a	potency’s	essence,	potencies	
“are	essentially	modal	properties”	(Bird	2007:	129).
Accordingly,	if	we	follow	Bird	and	let	S	be	the	stimulus	and	M	the	
manifestation	property	of	a	potency	P,	that	P	is	essentially	disposition-
al	or	modal	means	that	P	is	essentially	such	that	Ps	(P-instances)	are	
15.	 For	non-fundamental	mask-	or	finkable	dispositions,	 the	antecedent	of	 the	
subjunctive	has	 to	 include	 the	clause	 “and	finks	and	antidotes	 to	D
(S,M)
 are	
absent”	(Bird	2007:	60).	In	addition,	if	potencies	were multi-track (pace	Bird),	
the	corresponding	subjunctives	would	have	to	be	more	complex.	
	 	 For	the	purposes	of	the	present	paper,	however,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	the	
subjunctives	pertaining	to	the	nature	of	potencies	are	simple	or	complex.
16.	 Bird	(2007:	46)	formally	expresses	this	as	‘□	(Px →	(Sx □→	Mx))	’.
	 siegfried	jaag Dispositional essentialism and the grounding of natural modality
philosophers’	imprint	 –		5		–	 vol.	14,	no.	34	(december	2014)
dispositional	essentialism	are	two	mutually	 independent	 theses	and	
can	be	motivated	in	entirely	different	ways.	
On	the	one	hand,	it	might	be	held	that	conditional	analyses	of	dis-
positionality	fail	and	that	this	shows	that	dispositionality	is	a	sui generis 
modality	not	 reducible	 to	counterfactual	modality.27	However,	per se 
this	does	not	commit	one	to	the	view	that	any	natural	property	is	es-
sentially	equipped	with	this	primitive	kind	of	dispositional	modality.	
So	dispositional primitivism without essentialism	is	a	coherent	view.	
On	the	other	hand,	several	dispositional	essentialists	take	it	to	be	
impossible	that	a	natural	property	and	its	actual	nomological,	causal	
or	counterfactual	profile	come	apart	and	therefore	hold	that	it	is	essen-
tial	for	a	natural	property.	But	this	does	not	require	them	to	hold	that	
there	is	a	sui generis	dispositional	modality.	To	the	contrary,	one	may	
think	that	the	introduction	of	such	an	additional sui generis	disposition-
ality	makes	the	connection	between	laws	and	natural	properties	less	
straightforward	and	so	unnecessarily	complicates	matters.	According-
ly,	 endorsing	dispositional essentialism without dispositional primitivism 
seems	to	be	perfectly	coherent	as	well.28
2.1.2 A schematic formulation of the modal account of dispositionality (MAD)
Since,	 however,	 for	 the	main	 arguments	 against	ADE	 in	 section	 3	
it	 is	 irrelevant	whether	 these	natural	modalities	are	different	 from	
each	other	 and,	 if	 so,	which	 is	 the	one	 really	pertaining	 to	 the	 es-
sences	of	potencies,	we	will	formulate	the	essentialist	component	of	
ADE	in	a	schematic	way	that	is	neutral	on	these	questions.29	Accord-
ingly,	a	natural	way	to	state	the	essentialist	core	of	ADE	is	via	the	fol-
lowing	schema,	where	NMx	is	a	placeholder	for	the	corresponding	
natural	modality:
27.	Mumford	and	Anjum	(2011:	193)	seem	to	endorse	this	kind	of	reasoning.
28.	 “Nomic	essentialism”	or	“causal	essentialism”	might	be	appropriate	labels	for	
such	a	view.
29.	Notice,	however,	that	when	we	examine	some	more	moderate	forms	of	dispo-
sitionalism	in	section	4.1.1	below,	these	distinctions	become	relevant.
natural	 modality	 is	 nomological	 modality.23	 Correspondingly,	 and	
again	ignoring	interfering	factors	such	as	finks	and	masks,	that	a	non-
probabilistic	potency	P	has	a	dispositional	or	modal	essence	might	be	
stated	semi-formally	as	‘Ɛ
P
	(Px → (Sx	causes/causally	necessitates	Mx))’	
or	‘Ɛ
P
	(Px → (Sx	nomologically	necessitates	Mx))’,	respectively.24	Alter-
natively,	there	are	also	primitivist	versions	of	dispositionality	or	dispo-
sitional	modality.	According	to	the	powers	view	of	Mumford	and	An-
jum,	“the	modality	of	dispositionality	is	sui generis,	of	its	own	kind,	and	
certainly	not	reducible	to	pure	necessity	or	pure	contingency”	(Mum-
ford	and	Anjum	2011:	175).	If	we	let	◇
disp
	be	the	operator	expressing	
dispositional	possibility,	‘Ɛ
P
	(Px → ◇
disp
	Mx)’	seems	to	be	a	reasonable	
candidate	to	express	this	version	dispositional	essentialism.25	Alterna-
tively,	 the	dispositionalist	may	keep	to	the	stimulus-response	model	
of	dispositionality	but,	pace	Bird,	refrain	from	equating	D
(S,M)
x	with	a	
subjunctive	conditional	or	a	causal/nomological	connection.	Instead	
she	might	view	D
(S,M)
x	as	a	sui generis	dispositional	modal	connection	
between	stimulus	and	manifestation	and	regard	Ɛ
P
	(Px → D
(S,M)
x)	as	the	
appropriate	expression	of	the	essentialist	core.26
2.1.1 Excursus: Dispositional primitivism and dispositional essentialism
Before	we	 go	 on	 and	 introduce	 a	 neutral	 schematic	 formulation	 of	
ADE’s	essentialist	 core,	 it	 is	 important	 to	make	a	widely	overlooked	
distinction:	namely	that	primitivism	about	dispositional	modality	and	
23.	 	Choi	and	Fara	(2012)	characterise	dispositional	essentialism	thus:	“The	dis-
positionalist	holds	that	the	essence	of	a	property	P is	wholly	constituted	by	
the	nomic	or	causal	roles	P	plays	….”	
	 	 For	an	early	presentation	of	a	nomological	version	of	dispositional	essen-
tialism,	cf.	Swoyer	(1982).	The	locus classicus for	a	sophisticated	variant	of	a	
causal	version	of	dispositionalism	is	Shoemaker	(1980).	
24.	 Philosophers	 convinced	by	Russellian	 arguments	 against	 causation	on	 the	
fundamental	level	might	favour	the	nomic	over	the	causal	version.
25.	 Also,	combinations	of	different	natural	modalities	might	be	regarded	to	be	
included	in	the	dispositional	natures,	as	for	instance	in	Ɛ
P
	(Px →	(Sx □→	(Sx 
causes	Mx))).
26.	Of	 course,	 this	 list	 of	 candidate	modalities	 is	 not	 exhaustive.	 For	 instance,	
Barker	(2009:	ch.	4.3)	proposes	to	analyse	dispositionality	in	terms	of	chance.
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of	the	form	‘If	x	were	in	proximity	of	another	negatively	
charged	object,	it	would	move	away	from	it.’	(Vetter	2011:	
749;	my	emphasis)
The	first	formulation	might	be	put	thus:
(DAM1)		 NMx	is	grounded	in	Px.
The	second	formulation	in	the	passage	above	might	be	paraphrased	
as:
(DAM2)	 NMx	is	grounded	in	Ɛ
P
	(Px → NMx).
And	finally,	the	third	formulation	suggests	the	following:
(DAM3)	 NMx	is	grounded	in	the	dispositional	nature	of	P.32
And	again,	the	various	versions	of	NMx	give	rise	to	different	specific	
versions	of	DAM1,	DAM2	and	DAM3,	respectively.33
Before	examining	 the	 tenability	of	ADE	(i. e.,	 the	conjunctions	of	
MAD	and	one	of	DAM1–3),	 some	general	 remarks	about	grounding	
are	in	order.	
Although	it	is	widely	accepted	that	‘grounding’	marks	a	kind	of	non-
causal	metaphysical	priority,	 there	 are	 several	questions	 concerning	
the	conception	of	grounding	on	which	different	accounts	of	ground-
ing	diverge.	In	the	remaining	part	of	this	section,	we	will	outline	some	
lines	of	divergence	and	lay	out	which	features	of	grounding	are	central	
for	the	purposes	of	this	paper.
32.	 Besides	the	ones	already	quoted	here,	further	recent	grounding	or	truthmak-
ing	formulations	of	the	explanatory	part	of	dispositional	essentialism	can	be	
found	in	Ellis	(2002:	102),	Bostock	(2008:	155),	Jacobs	(2011:	90),	Mumford	
and	Anjum	(2011:	182),	Tugby	(2012:	729)	and	Yates	(2013:	119).
	 	 Since	we	agree	with	Barker	(2013:	640f.)	that	the	relation	between	natu-
ral	properties	and	natural	modalities	according	to	dispositional	essentialism	
is	metaphysical	rather	than	semantic,	it	is	more	appropriate	to	express	it	in	
terms	of	grounding.
33.	 Note	that	NMx	is	variably	constant	in	MAD	and	DAM 1–3,	i. e.,	designates	an	
arbitrary	but	fixed	natural	modality	throughout	MAD	and	DAM 1–3.	In	4.1.1	
we	discuss	versions	of	dispositionalism	that	give	up	on	constancy.
(MAD)	 Ɛ
P
	(Px → NMx).
Before	we	turn	to	the	explanatory	claim	associated	with	ADE,	notice,	
first,	that	MAD	is	neutral	on	the	question	whether	NMx	exhausts	the	
nature	of	a	potency	or	is	just	a	part	of	its	essence.30	Second,	MAD	per 
se	does	not	imply	pandispositionalism	but	is	consistent	with	the	view	
that	there	are	natural	properties	that	are	not	essentially	dispositional.	
And	third,	MAD	is	compatible	with	a	trope	theory	(cf.	Molnar	2003:	ch.	
1.2),	a	universals	view	(cf.	Bird	2007:	ch.	3.2.2)	and	even	a	set-theoretic	
account	of	dispositional	properties	(cf.	Whittle	2009).	
2.2 The dispositionalist account of natural modality (DAM)
Bird	(2007:	200)	states	that	“Mumford	and	I	agree	that	the	existence	of	
regularities	in	nature,	the	truth	of	counterfactuals,	and	the	possibility	
of	explanation	are	explained	by	the	potencies”.	Focusing	on	the	natu-
ral	modalities,	the	question	is	how	exactly	the	explanatory	claim	is	to	
be	understood.
In	Vetter	 (2011)	we	find	 three	different	candidate-readings	of	 the	
dispositionalist	account	of	modality:31
For	 dispositional	 essentialists,	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 are	
grounded in the dispositional properties	 at	 the	 fundamen-
tal	 level	 of	 nature:	 for	 instance,	 the	 law	 that	 like	 charg-
es,	when	in	proximity	of	each	other,	repel	each	other	 is	
grounded in the fact that it is the very nature of charge	 to	re-
pel	like	charges	when	in	proximity	to	them.	It	would	be	
surprising,	to	say	the	least,	if	that	very	same	dispositional 
nature should not also ground	 the	 truth	of	counterfactuals	
30.	That	the	natural	modality	exhausts	the	nature	or	constitutes	the	individual	
essence	of	P	might	be	expressed	via	‘Ɛ
P
	(Px ↔	NMx)	’.
31.	 As	we	read	her,	Vetter	herself	is	not	an	advocate	of	dispositional	essentialism.	
Instead,	in	Vetter	(2010)	she	is	engaged	in	a	project	alluded	to	in	section	4.1.1	
below,	namely	analysing	metaphysical	possibility	and	necessity	in	terms	of	
primitive	dispositionality	or	potentiality.	The	quoted	passage,	however,	nice-
ly	presents	the	various	possibilities	of	what	the	grounding	claim	associated	
with	dispositional	essentialism	might	be.
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For	 reasons	 of	 convenience,	 in	 the	 present	 paper	 we	 talk	 as	 if	
grounding	 is	 a	 (multigrade)	 relation	 that	 admits	 of	 entities	 from	 ar-
bitrary	ontological	categories.	However,	 it	 should	be	noted	 that,	mu-
tatis mutandis,	the	central	results	of	the	present	paper	seem	to	be	also	
obtainable	if,	e. g.,	one	adopts	a	sentence-operator	view	of	grounding	
instead	or	if	grounding	is	construed	as	a	relation	whose	relata	are	re-
stricted	 to	 facts.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 assumptions	 that	 a	 ground	 (partial	
or	full)	is	metaphysically	prior	to	what	it	grounds	and	therefore	that	
grounding	 is	 asymmetric	 are	 indispensable	 on	 various	 occasions	 in	
the	present	paper.37
3.  Challenging ADE
Let	us	now	consider	 the	question	whether	 the	essentialist	 core	 (i. e.,	
MAD)	and	at	least	one	of	the	grounding	claims	(i. e.,	DAM1–3)	go	to-
gether.	At	first,	we	will	briefly	outline	a	rather	general	worry	for	ADE	
(section	3.1).	After	that,	we	will	scrutinize	the	conjunction	of	MAD	and	
DAM3	(section	3.2)	and	then	examine	the	tenability	of	MAD	together	
with	DAM2	and	DAM1	in	more	detail	(sections	3.3	and	3.4).
3.1 The impurity worry
Never	 mind	 which	 version	 of	 DAM	 is	 adopted	—	prima facie	 there	
seems	to	be	a	rather	general	worry	for	ADE.	Let	us	assume	with	Bird	
that	potencies	are	 fundamental	properties.	Further,	according	 to	dis-
positional	essentialism,	MAD	is	a	fact	about	the	real	essence	of	a	fun-
damental	potency	P	and	not	 just	a	nominal	essence	of	dispositional	
predicates	or	concepts.	
The	essences	of	potencies	are	real	essences,	which	is	to	
say	they	concern	the	nature	of	the	property	in	question	
37.	 Since	the	asymmetry	excludes	self-grounding,	the	notion	of	ground	at	issue	
here	is	non-weak.	Cf.	Fine	(2012:	51ff.)	for	the	distinction	between	weak	and	
strict	ground.	
	 	 The	denial	of	 the	asymmetry	of	metaphysical	explanation	and	its	conse-
quence	for	ADE	will	be	discussed	towards	the	end	section	3.4.3	and	in	section	
4.1	below.
First,	a	grounding	explanation,	according	 to	Fine	 (2012:	37),	 is	 “a	
distinctive	kind	of	metaphysical	explanation,	in	which	explanans	and	
explanandum	are	connected,	not	through	some	sort	of	causal	mecha-
nism,	but	 through	some	constitutive	 form	of	determination”.	Such	a	
sui generis	metaphysical	kind	of	explanation	seems	to	be	needed,	be-
cause	exclusively	modal	notions	like	supervenience	do	not	seem	to	be	
suited	or	fine-grained	enough	 to	 capture	 central	 features	of	 ground-
ing	and	metaphysical	dependence.34	In	contrast,	Wilson	(2014)	denies	
that	a	distinctive	grounding	relation	is	needed	and	maintains	instead	
that	several	specific	metaphysical	dependence	relations	can	do	all	the	
work	grounding	is	meant	to	do.	
Second,	authors	agreeing	with	Kim	(1994:	67)	“that	dependence	re-
lations	of	various	kinds	serve	as	objective	correlates	of	explanations”	
treat	grounding	as	a	(multigrade)	relation	between	entities.	In	contrast,	
mainly	for	reasons	of	ontological	neutrality,	several	authors,	including	
Fine	(2001,	2012)	and	Correia	(2010),	reject	an	entity-relation	view	of	
grounding	and	 frame	grounding	 claims	with	 the	help	of	 a	 sentence	
operator	instead.35
Third,	Schaffer	(2009)	assumes	that	grounding	admits	of	relata	of	
different	ontological	categories.	 In	contrast,	other	authors,	 including	
Rosen	(2010),	want	to	restrict	the	relata	of	the	grounding	relation	to	
the	ontological	category	of	facts	instead.
And	fourth,	although	most	of	the	authors	take	grounding	(partial	as	
well	as	full)	to	be	irreflexive,	asymmetric,	transitive	and	well-founded,	
every	one	of	these	features	has	been	contested	in	the	relevant	literature.36
34.	Cf.	Fine	(1995b,	2012)	for	a	critique	of	modal	accounts	of	metaphysical	depen-
dence	and	ground.	Correia	and	Schnieder	(2012:	14)	give	a	nice	example	that	
is	indicative	of	the	hyperintensionality	of	grounding.
35.	 Fine	(2001:	16)	points	out	that	“there	is	no	need	to	suppose	that	a	ground	is	
some	fact	or	entity	in	the	world	or	that	the	notion	of	ground	is	inextricably	
connected	with	the	concept	of	truth.	The	questions	of	ground,	upon	which	
realist	questions	turn,	need	not	be	seen	as	engaging	either	with	the	concept	
of	truth	or	with	the	ontology	of	facts.”	
36.	Since	asymmetry	implies	irreflexivity,	it	is	enough	to	demand	the	former.	For	
a	survey	of	diverging	views	on	the	structural	principles	governing	grounding,	
cf.	Trogdon	(2013:	ch.	4).	
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(DAM3*)		 NMx	is	grounded	in	NMx.	
However,	since,	according	to	 the	orthodoxy	concerning	explanation	
in	general	and	(partial)	grounding	in	particular,	both	of	these	relations	
are	 irreflexive,	DAM3*	is	 false,	and	therefore	DAM3	seems	to	be	 in-
compatible	with	MAD.
3.3 Against MAD & DAM2
The	combination	of	MAD	and	DAM2	does	not	seem	very	promising	
either.	Assuming	that	a	truth’s	being	essential	grounds	its	being	meta-
physically	necessary,	Ɛ
P
	(Px → NMx)	grounds	□	(Px → NMx)	and,	argu-
ably,	also	Px → NMx.40	However,	 it	 is	utterly	unclear	how	we	obtain	
also	the	grounding	of	NMx	in	Ɛ
P
	(Px → NMx).	So	it	seems	that,	at	best,	
what	is	grounded	in	Ɛ
P
	(Px → NMx)	is	that	the	potency	does	not	(and	
cannot)	come	apart	from	its	associated	natural	modality.41
3.4 Against MAD & DAM 1
Let	us	now	consider	the	question	whether	MAD	and	DAM1	go	togeth-
er.	Before	we	present	arguments	that	support	a	negative	answer	(ch.	
3.4.2),	we	briefly	examine	one	kind	of	reasoning	that	might	be	invoked	
to	justify	the	claim	that	a	potency	P	grounds	the	natural	modality	per-
taining	to	its	own	essence.
3.4.1 Against essential necessitation as grounding 
The	advocate	of	ADE	might	concede	that	DAM2	is	untenable	but	claim	
that,	nonetheless,	 the	considerations	 in	3.3	provide	the	key	to	estab-
lish	DAM1,	namely	the	observation	that	Ɛ
P
	(Px → NMx)	 implies	that	
Px	necessitates	NMx.	The	dispositionalist	might	utilize	this	and	claim	
40.	These	 grounding	 claims	 are	 of	 course	non-trivial,	 but	we	do	not	have	 the	
space	to	discuss	them	in	the	present	paper.	For	detailed	elaborations	of	the	
idea	to	explain	necessity	in	terms	of	essence	cf.	Fine	(1994,	1995a,	2000).	
41.	 Following	Fine	(1995b:	273),	□
x	
p	says	that	p	is	true	in	virtue	of	the	identity	or	
nature	of	x.	Accordingly,	‘Ɛ
P
	(Px →	NMx)	’	might	be	understood	as	‘Px →	NMx 
is	grounded	in	the	nature	of	P’.	But	again,	even	if	true,	that	does	not	amount	
to	grounding	NMx.
and	are	not	merely	reflections	of	the	meanings	of	the	cor-
responding	terms.	(Bird	2007:	45)
The	reason	for	this	seems	to	be	that	if	such	a	deflationary	account	of	
property	essences	were	adopted,	it	would	be	doubtful	whether	disposi-
tional	essentialism	would	amount	to	a	metaphysical	and	non-Humean	
claim	at	all.38	But	if	MAD	is	understood	in	such	a	non-deflationary	way,	
the	dispositional	character	NMx	(at	 least	partly)	individuates	and	so	
makes	a	fundamental	potency	what	it	is.	Yet,	according	to	all	versions	
of	DAM,	NMx	 is	grounded;	and	 therefore,	 together	with	 the	widely	
held	 assumption	 that	 grounded	 entities	 are	 non-fundamental,	 NMx 
turns	out	to	be	non-fundamental.39	Putting	this	together,	we	seem	to	
obtain	 the	highly	 contentious	 result	 that	at	 least	 some	 fundamental	
properties	are	individuated	in	terms	of	the	metaphysically	posterior/
non-fundamental.	Furthermore,	MAD	itself	arguably	is	a	fundamental	
fact,	but	again,	seems	to	include	a	non-fundamental	component.	This,	
however,	seems	to	amount	to	a	massive	violation	of	the	doctrine	Sider	
(2011:	106)	calls	 “purity”,	namely	 the	view	that	 “fundamental truths in-
volve only fundamental notions”.
Since,	 however,	 Sider’s	 purity	 thesis	 cannot	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	
present	paper,	we	will	not	examine	this	worry	in	more	detail.	Instead,	
we	 turn	 to	more	detailed	criticisms	of	 the	various	grounding	claims	
that	are	not	based	on	the	assumption	of	the	purity	of	the	fundamental.
3.2 Against MAD & DAM3: No ground in (modal) essence
According	to	MAD,	the	essence	or	nature	of	a	potency	is	exhausted	by	
or	contains	NMx.	Correspondingly,	substituting	‘NMx’	for	‘the	disposi-
tional	nature	of	P’	in	DAM3,	we	get:	
38.	 If	dispositional	essentialism	were	understood	in	such	a	way,	it	would	be	com-
patible,	e. g.,	with	neutral	monism	about	properties.	Furthermore,	in	principle	
even	a	Humean	could	hold	that	‘is	negatively	charged’	non-rigidly	picks	out	
in	every	possible	world	whatever	quidditistic	property	plays	the	actual	nomic	
role	of	negative	charge.
39.	Cf.	Schaffer	(2009:	373)	and	Bennett	(manuscript)	 for	statements	of	a	tight	
connection	between	grounding	and	(relative)	fundamentality.
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The	central	problem	fleshed	out	 in	 this	argument	roughly	 is	 that	
an	entity	cannot	metaphysically	explain	or	ground	what	pertains	to	its	
own	essence	or	what	figures	in	its	real	definition,	respectively.
Assuming:
(MAD)	 Ɛ
P
	(Px → NMx).
and	a	principle	stating	a	certain	essential	dependence	between	P	and	
what	figures	in	P’s	essence:
(1)	 If	Ɛ
P
	 (Px → NMx),	 then	Px	 is	essentially	dependent	upon	
NMx.	
together	 with	 a	 principle	 connecting	 essential	 dependence	 and	
grounding:
(2)	 If	Px	is	essentially	dependent	upon	NMx,	then	it	is	not	the	
case	that	NMx	is	grounded	in	Px.
we	get	form	MAD,	1	and	2	via	modus ponens:	
(¬DAM1)		 It	is	not	the	case	that	NMx	is	grounded	in	Px.
In	the	remainder	of	the	present	paper	we	will	call	this	argument	the 
argument from essential dependence.44	Let	us	now	turn	to	the	examination	
of	the	premises	in	order	of	their	appearance.	
44.	We	 take	 this	 reasoning	 to	be	 an	 instance	of	 a	more	general	 argument.	Ac-
cordingly,	there	seems	to	be	an	analogous	general	argument	for	the	case	of	
particular	objects,	which	might	be	 relevant	 for	certain	other	doctrines.	For	
instance,	a	similar	tension	might	arise	for	the	conjunction	of	priority	monism	
and	mereological	essentialism:
	 Assume
	 	 (E)	Ɛ
x
 p.
	 where	p is	a	sentence	or	proposition	true	in	virtue	of	the	nature	of	a	particular	
x.	Further,	let	o	be	a	constituent	of	p,	i. e.,	an	object	p is	about.	
	 	 (O)	o	is	a	constituent	of	p.
	 If	we	follow	Fine	and	“take	x	to	depend	upon	y	if	y is	a	constituent	of	a	propo-
sition	that	is	true	in	virtue	of	the	identity	of	x”	(Fine	1995b:	275),	this	yields:
	 	 (1*)	If o	is	a	constituent	of	p,	then	x	is	essentially	dependent	upon	o. 
that	the	holding	of	this	necessary	connection	just	is	the	grounding	of	
NMx	in	Px	and	conclude	from	this	that	she	has	shown	that	DAM1	natu-
rally	flows	from	ADE’s	essentialist	core	MAD.
This	reasoning,	however,	is	surely	a	non sequitur.	Consider	the	prop-
erty	of	being	a	bachelor.	 It	 is	plausibly	 true	 in	virtue	of	 the	nature	of	
bachelorhood	that	if	someone	is	a	bachelor,	he	is	unmarried.	If	we	let	
B	stand	 for	bachelorhood	and	U	symbolize	 the	property	of	being	un-
married,	this	may	be	stated	as	Ɛ
B
	(Bx → Ux).	And	again,	assuming	that	
essence	 implies	necessity,	we	get	□	 (Bx → Ux)	and	 therefore	 that	be-
ing	a	bachelor	necessitates	being	unmarried.	However,	it	seems	clearly	
wrong	to	claim	that	bachelorhood	grounds	being	unmarried	(or,	mutatis 
mutandis,	being	a	man).	In	contrast,	it	seems	to	be	much	more	plausible	
to	claim	that	the	grounding	holds	in	the	opposite	direction.	Analogously,	
assuming	scientific	essentialism	as	advocated	by	Ellis	(2002),	being	an	
electron	necessitates	being	negatively	charged.	However,	being	nega-
tively	charged	is	surely	not	grounded	in	being	an	electron.42
The	general	moral	 to	be	drawn	from	examples	 like	these	 is	 that	
the	necessary	connection	that	holds	between	an	entity	and	what	per-
tains	to	its	essence	is	not	to	be	confused	with	grounding	the	latter	in	
the	former.43
3.4.2 The argument from essential dependence
Let	us	now	turn	to	a	more	direct	argument	against	the	conjunction	of	
MAD	and	DAM	1.	
42.	 Here	is	a	somewhat	analogous	case	concerning	individual	objects.	Consider	
the	singleton	set	{a}.	Because	arguably	a	pertains	to	the	essence	of	{a}	—	or,	
more	accurately,	containing	a	 is	an	essential	property	of	 this	set	—	it	 is	nec-
essarily	 true	 that	 if	 {a}	exists,	a	 exists.	However,	 {a}	 (’s	existence)	 is	 surely	
grounded	in	a	(’s	existence)	and	not	the	other	way	around.
43.	 A	similar	reasoning	might	be	relevant	for	certain	subset	accounts	of	proper-
ty-realization	according	to	which	properties	are	exhausted	by	certain	sets	of	
causal	powers.	If	the	realized	property	is	identified	with	a	subset	of	the	set	
of	causal	powers	that	makes	up	the	realizer	property,	arguably	the	realizer	
set/property,	qua	having	its	subsets	essentially,	necessitates	the	realized	set/
property.	Nonetheless,	 it	might	 be	maintained	 that	 subsets	 are	metaphysi-
cally	prior	to	their	supersets	and	thus	claimed	that	realization,	thus	construed,	
incorrectly	reverses	the	metaphysical	order	of	realizer	and	realized	property.	
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appears	natural	to	claim	that	if	v	is	grounded	in	u,	then	v	is	constituted	
by	u.	If	we	further	and	plausibly	assume	that	constitution	does	not	al-
low	for	circles,	A2	follows.
Prima facie A1	looks	correct,	too:	If u essentially	depends	upon	v	and	
so	v	makes	u	what	it	is,	it	seems	natural	to	claim	that	u	is	constituted	
by	v.	
However,	since	we	are	dealing	with	properties	(or	property	instan-
tiations,	respectively),	two	problems	for	A1	might	arise.	The	first	rather	
general	problem	is	that	“it	is	unclear	what	it	means	to	say	that	proper-
ties	have	constituents	or	parts”	(Stoljar	2008:	S.266).
Secondly,	A1	can	be	denied,	even	though	it	is	granted	that	proper-
ties	in	principle	can	have	constituents.	Conceiving	of	essences	as	real	
definitions,	Rosen	(2010:	125)	points	out	that	if	one	property	figures	in	
the	real	definition	of	another,	the	former	need	not	be	a	constituent	of	
the	latter.	He	illustrates	this	point	with	the	example	of	the	property	of	
being	grue.	While	the	properties	of	being	blue	and	being	green	figure	
in	 its	 real	definition,	he	maintains	 that	 it	 is	wrong	 to	 say	 that	 these	
properties	constitute	the	property	of	being	grue.	Rosen	concludes	that	
in	general	we	should	think	of	the	items	appearing	in	the	real	definition	
as	arguments	of	a	function	and	not	as	constituents.46
A	first	rejoinder	to	these	worries	may	be	that,	in	the	case	of	fairly	
natural	non-disjunctive	properties	like	potencies,	the	items	figuring	in	
their	real	definitions	indeed	are	constitutive	for	them;	and	so	even	if	
A1	has	to	be	restricted	to	fairly	natural	properties,	the	argument	is	still	
general	enough	to	affect	ADE.47 
Secondly,	since	Rosen	(2010:	125)	and	Stoljar	(2008)	seem	to	think	
that	 the	 constitution	 relation	 is	 composition	or	 part-whole,	 another	
route	 to	bypass	 these	 considerations	would	be	 to	maintain	 that	 the	
46.	Against	A1,	it	might	be	maintained	that	although	it	is	implausible	to	think	of	
the	arguments	of	a	function	as	constituents	or	parts	of	their	values,	it	seems	
natural	to	say	that	the	value	of	a	function	depends	upon	its	arguments.
47.	 Rosen	 (2010:	 125)	acknowledges	 that,	e. g.,	 in	 the	case	of	 conjunctive	prop-
erties,	 the	claim	that	 the	conjuncts	constitute	the	conjunctive	property	has	
some	plausibility.
3.4.3 Assessing the argument from essential dependence
Premise	 1	 might	 be	 attacked	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 property	 essences	
could	be	conceived	as	conceptual	truths	instead	and	so	a	connection	
between	 essence	 and	 essential	 dependence	 does	 not	 need	 to	 arise.	
However,	as	we	saw	in	3.1	above,	such	a	deflationary	conception	of	
property	essences	does	not	seem	to	be	available	for	the	defender	of	
dispositional	essentialism.	
	Let	us	now	turn	to	premise	2	and	so	to	the	question	how	we	can	
establish	the	link	between	essential	dependence	and	grounding.
A	first	possibility	to	establish	this	link	is	indirect,	i. e.,	via	a	general	
connection	between	essential	dependence	and	constitution.	Accord-
ingly,	the	first	additional	auxiliary	premise	says:
(A1)		If	u	is	essentially	dependent	upon	v,	then	u	is	constituted	
by	v.45
and	the	second	states	a	general	principle	connecting	constitution	and	
grounding:
(A2)	If	 u	 is	 constituted	 by	 v,	 then	 it	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 v	 is	
grounded	in	u.
A1	and	A2	yield	premise	2	via	hypothetical syllogism	and	the	appropriate	
substitutions.	The	question	now	is	whether	they	are	true.	
A2	seems	to	be	highly	plausible:	If	we	assume	that	in	the	case	of	
grounding	 “the	 explanans	 or	 explanantia	 are	 constitutive of	 the	 ex-
planandum,	or	that	the	explanandum’s	holding	consists in nothing more 
than	the	obtaining	of	the	explanans	or	explanantia”	(Fine	2012:	39),	it	
	 together	with	a	principle	connecting	essential	dependence	and	grounding:
	 	 (2*)	If	x is	essentially dependent	upon	o,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	o is			
	 grounded	in x.
	 we	get	form	E,	O,	1*	and	2*	via	modus ponens:	
	 	 (¬G)	It	is	not	the	case	that	o	is	grounded	in	x.
45.	 In	the	rest	of	this	subsection,	the	variables	u and v may	stand	for	entities	from	
arbitrary	ontological	categories.
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essentially	depend	on	each	other	or	 that	 essential	 self-dependence	
is	possible.51
So	the	central	question	is	whether	there	is	a	way	to	establish	prem-
ise	2	without	the	identification	of	essential	dependence	with	ground-
ing,	A1	or	A3.	If	the	following	reasoning	is	sound,	the	answer	is	yes.
To	do	this	we	will	appeal	to	a	principle	we	already	mentioned	in	2.2	
and	utilized	in	3.1,	namely	the	apparent	platitude	that	the	grounding	
entity	or	fact	is	metaphysically	prior	to	or	more	fundamental	than	the	
grounded	entity	or	fact:
(A5)		If v is	grounded	in	u,	then u is	metaphysically	prior	to/more	
fundamental	than	v.
And	even	if	one	holds	that	two	distinct	entities	can	be	reciprocally	es-
sentially	 dependent	 or	 that	 essential	 self-dependence	 is	 allowed,	 it	
seems	to	be	utterly	incoherent	to	claim	that	the	depender	is	metaphys-
ically	prior	to	the	dependee.	So	it	seems	to	be	equally	plausible	that:
(A6)	If u is	essentially	dependent	upon	v,	then	it	is	not	the	case	
that u is	metaphysically	prior	to/more	fundamental	than	v.
From	A6	and	the	contraposition	of	A5	we	eventually	get	premise	2	via	
hypothetical	syllogism.
Here	 is	 a	 possible	 riposte	 to	 this	 reasoning.	 Both	 A5	 and	 A6,	 it	
might	be	claimed,	are	compulsory	only	on	fairly	strong	conceptions	
of	grounding	and	essential	dependence,	respectively.	However,	these	
notions	can	be	spelled	out	in	more	deflationary	ways,	such	that	A5	and	
A6	turn	out	to	be	wrong.	On	a	simplistic	modal	(existential)	concep-
tion	of	grounding,	according	to	which,	roughly,	grounding	reduces	to	
the	necessitation	of	the	grounded	by	the	ground,	metaphysical	priority	
or	comparative	fundamentality	do	not	seem	to	be	required,	and	so	A5	
51.	 Cf.	Lowe	(2010:	section	4)	for	an	example	of	mutual	essential	dependence.	
	 However,	Bird	thinks	that	“[e]ssentially	dispositional	properties	have	their	
identities	 fixed	 by	 their	 dispositional	 characters”	 (Bird	 2007:	 44).	 Since	
in	 this	 case	 essential	 dependence	 is	 identity	 dependence,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 
anymore	 that	 the	 alleged	difference	obtains,	 since	 identity	dependence	 is	
arguably	also	asymmetric.
constitution	in	the	case	of	properties	is	of	a	non-mereological	kind	and	
therefore	A1	can	be	retained.
A	third	related	rejoinder	consists	in	claiming	that	the	kind	of	con-
stitution	in	the	case	of	essential	dependence	simply	is	grounding	and	
there	is	no	need	to	frame	the	latter	in	mereological	terms.	Assuming	
that,	the	case	for	premise	2	is	even	more	straightforward,	since	we	can	
derive	it	solely	with	the	help	of	the	asymmetry	of	grounding,	 in	the	
following	way:
Given	the	assumption	that
(A3)	If	u	 is	 essentially	 dependent	 upon	v,	 then	u	 is	 (partially)	
grounded	in	v. 
and	the	asymmetry	of	grounding	
(A4)		If	u	is	(partially)	grounded	in	v,	it	is	not	the	case	that	v	is	
grounded	in	u.
premise	2	follows,	mutatis mutandis,	by	hypothetical syllogism.	
One	 could	 even	 go	 further	 and	 take	 the	 synonymous	 use	 of	 ‘es-
sential	dependence’,	‘grounding’	and	‘metaphysical	priority’	by	several	
authors	at	face	value	and	equate	these	relations.48	If	this	is	done	and	
correspondingly	 ‘is	 grounded	 in’	 is	 substituted	 for	 ‘is	 essentially	 de-
pendent	upon’	in	premise	1,49	then	only	MAD	and	A4	(with	the	appro-
priate	substitutions)	have	to	be	added	to	derive	¬DAM1.
However,	equating	essential	dependence	and	grounding	as	well	
as	 A1	 and	A3	might	 be	 rejected,	 since	 grounding	 and	 constitution	
are	asymmetric	and	therefore	irreflexive	while	essential	dependence	
arguably	 is	 not;50 e. g.,	 one	may	 hold	 that	 certain	 entities	mutually	
48.	Cf.	Schaffer	(2010:	345),	Rosen	(2010:	109)	and	Clark	and	Liggins	(2012:	812).
49.	 Rosen	(2010:	122–123)	seems	 to	accept	a	very	similar	principle	connecting	
the	propositions	figuring	in	a	real	definition	and	the	holding	of	a	grounding	
relation	between	the	corresponding	facts.
50.	Here	 is	 another	 consideration	 that	militates	 against	 equating	essential	 de-
pendence	and	grounding:	Arguably	the	fact	that	p or	q	is	grounded	in	the	fact	
that	p,	but	the	former	disjunctive	fact	is	not	essentially	dependent	on	the	fact	
that	p.
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Barnes	 (manuscript)	 and	Wilson	 (2014).	 Since	 priority	 and	 relative	
fundamentality	 are	obviously	 asymmetric,	 also	 the	widely	held	 con-
nection	 between	 grounding,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 priority	 and	 rel-
ative	 fundamentality,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	broken,	and	so	A5	must	
be	denied.	Within	 the	present	paper,	 however,	 there	 is	no	 space	 to	
discuss	this	move	in	detail.	We	think,	however,	that	there	is	a	notion	
of	asymmetrical	ontological	dependence	that	is	closely	connected	to	
relative	 fundamentality	or	priority	and,	maybe	more	 importantly,	 to	
explanation;	 and	 giving	 up	 on	 these	 connections	makes	 appeals	 to	
grounding	relations	less	interesting	for	many	philosophical	purposes.54 
For	instance,	in	4.1	below,	it	will	be	argued	that	if	the	dispositionalist	
appeals	to	holistic	metaphysical	explanation	instead	of	(asymmetrical)	
grounding,	the	view	loses	much	of	its	initial	attraction.
We	leave	the	discussion	of	premise	2,	and	thus	of	the	argument	from	
essential	dependence,	at	that.	The	above	considerations	show	that	the	
argument	has	 some	plausibility,	 and	 in	order	 to	 rebut	 it,	 some	 fairly	
contentious	and	far-reaching	assumptions	have	to	be	made.	If	it	is	in-
deed	sound,	however,	the	conjunction	of	MAD	and	DAM1	is	untenable.	
4. Whither dispositional essentialism?
Assuming	that	the	considerations	in	section	3	are	correct,	there	is	a	se-
rious	tension	between	the	essentialist	thesis	MAD	and	the	claim	that	
(the	natures	of)	potencies	ground	the	corresponding	natural	modalities	
(DAM),	and	since	MAD	+	DAM	=	ADE,	the	latter	has	to	be	rejected.	If	
this	tension	cannot	be	resolved,	dispositionalism	cannot	provide	“a	uni-
fied	metaphysical	grounding	 for	natural	modalities	 in	general”	 (Choi	
and	Fara	2012:	section	3),	since	the	natural	modalities	pertaining	to	the	
potencies’	essences	must	remain	ungrounded.	So	it	seems	worthwhile	
to	take	a	look	at	some	remaining	options	for	the	dispositionalist.	
54. E. g.,	if	the	connection	between	grounding	and	relative	fundamentality	is	de-
nied,	it	is	not	sufficient	for	the	advocate	of	the	non-fundamentality	about x	to	
show	that	x	is	grounded.	In	the	following,	we	will	therefore	reserve	the	label	
‘grounding’	for	asymmetric	metaphysical	dependence.
can	be	rejected.	A	corresponding	move	might	be	made	in	the	case	of	
essential	 dependence	 and	essence	 and	utilized	 as	 a	basis	 for	 reject-
ing	A6.	Again,	on	a	naive	modal	account	of	essential	dependence,	for	
example,	 that u is	essentially	dependent	upon v also	roughly	comes	
down	to	the	fact	that	it	is	impossible	for u to	exist	without v existing,	
i. e.,	that	all	u-worlds	are	v-worlds.	It	might	be	claimed	that	the	holding	
of	this	necessary	connection	between u and v is	not	in	principle	in	con-
flict	with u being	metaphysically	prior	to	or	more	fundamental	than	v.
To	respond	to	this,	a	general	discussion	of	grounding,	essence	and	
essential	 dependence	 would	 be	 required,	 which	 cannot	 be	 accom-
plished	in	the	present	paper.	However,	some	very	general	remarks	are	
in	order.	Most	notably,	Fine	(1995b,	2012)	presents	strong	arguments	
against	modal	accounts	of	essential	dependence	and	grounding;	and	
it	is	thus	unclear	whether	such	reductive	accounts	are	available	at	all.	
For	 instance,	 the	modal	 account	 cannot	 accommodate	 the	 asymme-
try	 of	 grounding	 in	 a	 straightforward	manner,	 let	 alone	 its	 hyperin-
tensionality.	 Additionally,	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	metaphysical	
priority	of	the	ground	is	the	basis	for	the	asymmetry	of	the	grounding	
relation,52	 its	missing	directionality	on	a	modal	account	can	even	be	
explained	by	the	failure	to	ensure	A5.	So	instead	of	thinking	of	the	fact	
that	a	naive	modal	conception	of	ground	allows	for	grounding	without	
metaphysical	priority	as	a	virtue,	we	regard	it	as	a	reductio	of	this	ac-
count.	Similarly,	on	our	view	the	possibility	that	a	simplistic	modal	ac-
count	of	essential	dependence	in	principle	makes	room	for	an	entity	to	
be	prior	or	more	fundamental	to	the	entities	pertaining	to	its	essence	
is	a	defect	of	the	account	and	not	a	merit.53
Another	more	general	and	principled	response	to	the	argument	of	
essential	dependence	would	be	to	keep	to	a	unified	and	maybe	non-
modal	 conception	 of	 ontological	 dependence	 but	 to	 explicitly	 deny	
that	grounding	is	asymmetric,	which	has	recently	been	suggested	in	
52.	 Cf.	Rosen	(2010:	116).
53.	 For	instance,	the	implausibility	of	the	claim	that	Socrates	depends	on	its	sin-
gleton	seems	to	be	based	on	the	intuitions	that,	first,	Socrates	is	prior	to	its	
singleton	and,	second,	the	depender	cannot	be	prior	to	its	dependee.
	 siegfried	jaag Dispositional essentialism and the grounding of natural modality
philosophers’	imprint	 –		13		– vol.	14,	no.	34	(december	2014)
upon	the	potencies,	and	this	mutual	metaphysical	dependence	some-
how	amounts	to	a	certain	kind	of	holistic	or	mutual	explanation.57
However,	even	if	it	can	be	made	plausible	that	there	are	metaphysi-
cal	explanations	of	a	non-asymmetric	kind,	the	fundamental	structure	
of	reality	posited	by	the	dispositionalist	is	(at	least	ideologically)	very	
rich	and	non-Humean	in	two	respects:	Substantial facts about property 
essences	(or	the	associated	metaphysical	necessities,	respectively)	as	
well	as	the	“contents” of these essences	(natural	modalities	such	as	coun-
terfactuals,	laws,	causation	or	primitive	dispositionality)	carve	nature	
at	its	joints.
Of	course,	despite	being	not	very	parsimonious,	such	a	form	of	
dispositional	essentialism	might	still	be	regarded	as	an	interesting	
non-Humean	view,	i. e.,	one	in	which	certain	natural	modalities	are	
necessarily	 connected	 to	 fundamental	 properties.58	 Whatever	 its	
merits	may	be,	however,	since	it	is	a	version	of	fundamentalism	not	
just	about	essential	facts	about	properties	but	about	natural	modal-
ity,	too,	it	can	hardly	be	claimed	to	be	as	sparse	as	Humeanism	or	
more	parsimonious	than	its	non-Humean	rivals.	If	the	disposition-
alist’s	vision	sketched	 in	section	1.2	above	 turns	out	 to	be	an	 illu-
sion,	though,	a	dispositional	metaphysics	seems	to	lose	much	of	its	
initial	attraction.	
4.1.1 Not ADE but something near enough?
Even	if	the	natural	modality	essential	for	P	cannot	be	grounded	in	P	
or	 its	 dispositional	 essence	 and	 so	ADE	must	 be	 abandoned,	 there	
still	 seem	 to	 be	 several	 interesting	 grounding	 projects	 compatible	
with	MAD	left	alive.	Here	is	a	list	of	three	(families	of)	less	ambitious	
grounding	projects.
57.	 Arguably,	such	a	less	ambitious	form	of	dispositional	essentialism	is	present-
ed	in	Shoemaker	(1980).	
58.	Or,	more	exactly,	natural	properties	 and	natural	modalities	 are	necessarily	
connected	 in	 every	metaphysically	 possible	world	where	 these	 properties	
exist.
4.1 Deny DAM and retain MAD: Fundamentalism about natural modality
Given	MAD,	potencies	depend	upon	or,	assuming	A1	or	A3,	are	even	
constituted	by	or	grounded	in	certain	natural	modalities	(in	contrast	
to	what	is	claimed	by	ADE).	If	the	latter,	it	might	be	maintained,	for	
example,	that	certain	subjunctive	facts	are	primitive,	as	suggested	in	
Lange	(2009),	and	then	held	that	these	facts	metaphysically	explain	
the	potencies.	Alternatively,	a	form	of	nomological	primitivism	as,	e. g.,	
presented	in	Maudlin	(2007)	and	Carroll	(1987)	or	causal	primitivism	
might	be	adopted,	and	it	might	be	held	that	fundamental	properties	
are	 grounded	 in	 these	primitive	nomological	 or	 causal	 facts.55	How-
ever,	 there	are	 two	problems	with	 these	variants	of	dispositional	es-
sentialism.	First,	 they	sacrifice	 the	explanatory	aim	of	ADE,	because	
dispositional	properties	are	metaphysically	explained	by	certain	(nat-
ural)	modalities	 instead	 of	 explaining	 them.	Dispositional	 essential-
ism	 thus	 construed	does	not	 deliver	 any	 explanation	of	 the	natural	
modalities	 but	 boils	 down	 to	 the	 postulation	of	 an	 essential	 depen-
dence	 of	 the	 natural	 properties	 upon	 certain	 natural	modalities.	 So	
instead	of	considering	such	a	view	to	be	a	dispositionalist	 theory	of	
natural	modalities,	it	seems	more	appropriate	to	describe	it	as	a	modal	
(counterfactual,	nomic,	causal,	etc.)	theory	of	natural	properties.	Sec-
ondly,	assuming	again	a	tight	connection	between	grounding	and	rel-
ative	fundamentality,	if	potencies	are	grounded	in	natural	modalities,	
the	former	seem	to	turn	out	to	be	non-fundamental	—	counter	to	what	
most	dispositionalists	claim.56
As	has	been	already	indicated	in	section	3.4.3	above,	an	alternative	
and	presumably	more	attractive	view	would	be	that	although	poten-
cies	essentially	depend	upon	natural	modalities,	the	latter	also	depend	
55.	 Again,	for	those	persuaded	by	broadly	Russellian	considerations	against	fun-
damental	causal	relations,	the	second	alternative	is	not	very	attractive.
56.	Although	Bird	considers	potencies	to	be	fundamental	(cf.	the	cited	passages	
in	section	1),	it	is	tempting	to	read	Bird	(2007:	138–146)	as	claiming	that	first-
order	potencies	are	indeed	grounded	in	graph	networks	built	up	solely	from	
a	single	higher-order	manifestation	relation.
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that	the	essentialist	part	of	ADE	does	not	play	a	vital	role	and	can	be	
dispensed	with.	
A	 second	 interesting	grounding	project	 compatible	with	MAD	 is	
alluded	to	on	the	final	page	in	Bird	(2007):
This	opens	up	the	possibility	of	a	dispositional	account	of	
modality.	Note	that	□ p ≡	¬p □→ p.	So	if	[the	conditional	
analysis]	were	true,	we	could	use	this	equivalence	to	pro-
vide	a	dispositional	analysis	of	necessity;	details	await	de-
velopment.	(Bird	2007:	218,	Fn.	143).
The	 project	 here	 is	 to	 derive	 metaphysical	 necessity	 and	 possibil-
ity	 from	counterfactual	modality.	Alternatively,	 instead	of	grounding	
metaphysical	necessity	in	counterfactuals,	it	has	been	tried	to	ground	
metaphysical	necessity	 in	 sui	 generis	dispositional	possibility	or	po-
tentiality.62	But	again,	important	as	these	projects	may	be	for	a	natural-
ist	account	of	metaphysical	necessity,	they	are	different	from	DAM1–3	
and	again	independent	from	the	question	whether	fundamental	prop-
erties	are	essentially	dispositional.
A	third	grounding	project	is	suggested	by	Bird’s	derivation	of	the	
laws	of	nature	(cf.	Bird	2007:	46–48).	Since	the	crucial	premise	of	the	
derivation	 is	□	 (Px → (Sx □→	Mx)),	 first,	 Bird	 equates	 the	 disposi-
tional	character	D
(S,M)
x	 in	□	 (Px → D
(S,M)
x)	with	a	subjunctive	condi-
tional.	From	□	(Px → (Sx □→	Mx)),	then	∀x	((Sx∧Px)	→ Mx)	is	logi-
cally	deduced	in	a	straightforward	way	(for	the	details,	cf.	Bird	2007:	
46).	However,	∀x	((Sx∧Px)	→ Mx)	is	simply	a	non-modal	regularity;	
so,	if	we	understand	this	derivation	as	grounding	the	laws	in	the	fact	
that	potencies	have	a	dispositional	or	subjunctive	nature,	this	deriva-
tion	is	a	case	not	of	grounding	a	natural	modality,	but	of	grounding	a	
non-modal	regularity	in	an	essentialist	and	therefore	metaphysically	
necessary	 fact	 containing	a	 counterfactual.	 It	might	be	emphasized,	
though,	that	□	(Px → (Sx □→	Mx))	does	not	entail	just	the	regularity	
62.	Vetter	(2010)	and	Borghini	and	Williams	(2008)	are	two	different	versions	of	
a	dispositionalist	approach	to	metaphysical	necessity	and	possibility.
Assuming	that	there	are	different	kinds	of	natural	modalities,	the	
first	possible	grounding	project	 compatible	with	MAD	 is	grounding	
the	remaining	natural	modalities	in	the	one	natural	modality	consid-
ered	to	be	essential	for	the	potencies	and	therefore	to	be	fundamental.	
For	example,	if	it	is	held	that	the	dispositional	essence	of	a	potency	P	
contains	a	sui generis	dispositional	possibility	◇
disp
,	the	claim	might	be	
that	the	remaining	natural	modalities	are	grounded	in	◇
disp
.59	Alterna-
tively,	 if	 counterfactuals,	 laws	or	causation	are	considered	 to	be	 the	
fundamental	modalities,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	other	modalities	
are	grounded	 in	 it.	Accordingly,	ADEs	essentialist	 core	 is	consistent	
with	the	claim	that	dispositional	essences	ground	natural	modalities	as	
long	as	the	base	modality	figuring	in	the	particular	instance	of	MAD	is	
different	from	the	natural	modality	in	the	grounding	claim.60	However,	
two	remarks	about	this	project	are	in	order:	First,	as	already	noted,	it	
is	based	on	the	assumption	that	some	natural	modality	is	fundamental,	
i. e.,	 ungrounded;	 and,	 second,	 figuring	 out	 the	metaphysical	 hierar-
chy	in	the	realm	of	natural	modalities	like	◇
disp
,	nomological	modality,	
counterfactual	modality,	causal	modality,	etc.,	is	largely	independent	
from	the	question	whether	the	“base	modality”	is	essential	for	some	
natural	property	or	not.	For	example,	certain	subjunctive	facts,	laws	or	
facts	about	primitive	dispositionality	(cf.	the	excursus	in	section	2.1.1)	
might	be	regarded	as	being	fundamental,	and	the	remaining	modali-
ties,	assuming	there	are	any,	as	being	grounded	in	them.	However,	this	
view	does	not	commit	one	to	the	further	thesis	that	any	of	these	mo-
dalities	pertain	to	the	essences	of	natural	properties.61	So	if	the	dispo-
sitionalist	is	interested	just	in	this	kind	of	grounding	project,	it	seems	
59.	Of	course,	it	would	have	to	be	made	plausible	how	a	sui generis	dispositional	
modality	 is	apt	 to	ground	causation	and	the	 like.	Cf.	Mumford	and	Anjum	
(2011)	for	an	attempt	to	demonstrate	this.
60.	If	P	is	identified	with	the	“base	modality”	essential	for	it	(and	we	ignore	hy-
perintensionality),	it	might	even	be	maintained	that	P	itself	grounds	the	natu-
ral	modalities	different	from	the	“base	modality”.
61.	 For	instance,	Lange	(2009)	pursues	the	project	of	grounding	laws	in	primitive	
subjunctive	facts	without	subscribing	to	essentialism.
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4.2 Deny MAD and retain DAM: De-modalizing dispositionality
In	contrast	to	what	is	suggested	by	most	formulations	of	dispositional	
essentialism,	 it	 might	 be	 maintained	 that	 dispositionality	 need	 not	
be	understood	in	terms	of	a	natural	modality	and,	accordingly,	MAD	
might	be	denied.	In	this	subsection	we	briefly	address	several	ways	in	
which	this	strategy	might	be	spelled	out.
4.2.1 Direct Property Grounding Dispositionalism
A	first	possible	view	of	this	kind	says	that	natural	modalities	are	direct-
ly	grounded	in	fundamental	properties	whose	essences	(if	they	have	
them)	do	not	involve	natural	modalities.	
Note	 that	 this	 variety	of	dispositionalism	 is	different	 from	Lewis’	
Neo-Humeanism,	 since	 on	 the	 former	 view	 (the	 instantiation	 of)	 a	
natural	property	is	supposed	to	fully	ground	a	certain	natural	modality,	
whereas	according	to	Neo-Humeanism,	(the	instantiation	of)	a	natural	
property,	as	part	of	the	Humean	mosaic,	is	only	a	partial	ground.	Fur-
thermore,	assuming	that	grounding	implies	necessitation,	Direct	Prop-
erty	Grounding	Dispositionalism	has	the	consequence	that,	contrary	
to	Neo-Humeanism,	 a	 natural	 property	 and	 its	 actual	modal	 profile	
cannot	come	apart.	
4.2.2 Quidditistic/Qualitative Essence Grounding Dispositionalism
Instead	 of	 grounding	 the	 natural	 modalities	 directly	 in	 the	 non-
modal	 properties,	 one	 could	 maintain	 that	 they	 are	 grounded	 in	
non-naturally	modal	property	essences	instead.	So	a	second	option	
might	 be	 to	 claim	 that	 natural	modalities	 are	 grounded	 in	 (thick)	
quidditistic	or	qualitative	property	essences,	which	themselves	are	
not	essentially	modal.
Such	a	view	might	be	an	option	for	adherents	of	the	view	that	fun-
damental	properties	are	qualitative	but	nonetheless	 thereby	ground	
the	natural	modalities,	such	as	Martin	and	Heil	(1999),	Jacobs	(2011)	
and	Tugby	(2012).65
65.	 Two	variants	of	the	powerful-qualities	view	are	examined	in	more	detail	in	
section	4.4	below.
but	 also	□ ∀x	 ((Sx∧Px)	→ Mx),	 and	 it	might	 be	 claimed	 that	 this	
shows	 that	 the	 thus	derived	 laws	are	metaphysically	necessary	and	
that	 therefore	 nomological	 necessity	 is	 grounded	 in	 and	 equally	
strong	as	metaphysical	necessity.63
However,	showing	that	∀x	 ((Sx∧Px)	→ Mx)	or	□ ∀x	 ((Sx∧Px)	→ 
Mx),	respectively	can	be	logically	deduced	from	□	(Px → (Sx □→	Mx))	
is	not	sufficient	to	establish	the	corresponding	grounding	claim.	For	
instance,	p	can	be	logically	deduced	from	p,	but	p	is	surely	not	ground-
ed	in	p.	Even	worse,	q	can	be	logically	deduced	from	p	and	q	but	the	
(partial)	grounding	plausibly	goes	in	the	opposite	direction.64
In	response,	 it	might	be	claimed	that	□	 (Px → (Sx □→	Mx))	 itself	
is	grounded	in	Ɛ
P
	(Px → (Sx □→	Mx)),	and	be	claimed	that,	following	
Fine	 (1994),	 the	 latter	 is	non-modal;	and	 thus	 that	 the	metaphysical	
and	 therewith	nomological	necessity	of	 the	 laws	has	a	 (non-modal)	
ground	after	all.	Note,	however,	that	if	this	strategy	is	pursued,	the	only	
grounded	necessity,	i. e.	nomological	necessity,	seems	to	fully	originate	
from	Finean	essence	and	not	from	the	content	of	the	potency’s	essence,	
i. e.,	its	dispositional	nature.
Be	that	as	it	may,	for	the	purposes	of	our	present	discussion,	it	is	
important	to	note	that	the	above	derivation	is	based	on	□	(Px → (Sx □→ 
Mx))	or	Ɛ
P
	(Px → (Sx □→	Mx)),	respectively,	and	therefore	on	a	fact	that	
contains	an	ungrounded	natural	modality.
In	sum,	while	these	three	grounding	projects	seem	to	be	interest-
ing	and	worth	developing,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	in	all	of	
them	a	certain	kind	of	natural	modality	is	postulated	to	be	fundamen-
tal,	i. e.,	ungrounded,	and	therefore	ADE	is	abandoned.
63.	Of	course,	in	a	possible	word	where	P	fails	to	be	instantiated,	the	generaliza-
tion	is	only	vacuously	true	and	so	lacks	the	status	of	being	a	law.	To	obtain	
the	stronger	claim	that	all	possible	worlds	are	governed	by	the	same	set	of	
(non-vacuous)	laws,	additional	assumptions	have	to	be	made.	For	a	critique	
of	equating	metaphysical	and	nomological	necessity,	cf.	Fine	(2002).
64.	Furthermore,	logical	deduction	is	also	not	necessary	for	grounding.	Arguably,	
singleton	Socrates’	 existence	 is	 grounded	 in	 and	 therefore	necessitated	by	
Socrates’	existing.	However,	singleton	Socrates’	existing	cannot	be	logically	
deduced	from	Socrates’	existing	in	a	straightforward	way.
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4.2.5 An inference problem 
The	options	sketched	in	section	4.2.2–4.2.4	might	be	preferred	to	the	
version	of	dispositionalism	outlined	 in	section	4.2.1,	because	on	 the	
former	views,	natural	properties	clearly	have	essences	of	some	kind	
and	there	is	no	danger	that	the	name	‘dispositional	essentialism’	is	an	
outright	misnomer	for	the	position(s).	
But	the	problem	with	all	five	options	mentioned	in	4.2	is	that	the	
holding	of	an	explanatory	relation	cannot	be	established	by	mere	stipu-
lation	—	never	mind	whether	 this	 relation	 is	posited	between	not	 es-
sentially	modal	properties	or	quiddities	and	the	natural	modalities,	or	
between	 non-naturally-modal	 property	 essences	 of	 some	 other	 kind	
and	the	natural	modalities.	So	unless	it	is	made	plausible	that	the	prop-
erty	or	the	additional	“structure”	making	up	the	property	essence	is	a	
ground	of	natural	modalities	without	in	turn	recurring	to	its	naturally	
modal	nature,	the	options	mentioned	in	4.2	seem	to	be	ad hoc,	and	it	is	
at	least	unclear	if	they	are	explanatory	at	all.	For	instance,	if	we	take	P’s	
nature	to	consist	in	the	having	of	a	quiddity,	the	holding	of	a	second-or-
der	manifestation	relation	R(P,	M)	to	its	manifestation	property	M	or	in	
a	“metaphysical	pointing	to”	its	manifestation,	it	has	to	be	made	plau-
sible	how	these	facts	manage	to	ground,	e. g.,	first-order	counterfactu-
als.	 It	 seems	 that	all	 these	views	have	 to	 face	a	challenge	somewhat	
reminiscent	 of	 the	 inference	 problem	 for	 the	 Dretske-Tooley-Arm-
strong	account	of	laws	of	nature:68	The	question	here	is	“why	should	…	
a	fancy	relation’s	holding	between	two	universals,	translate	into	hard	
facts	 below,	 facts	 about	 earthly	 particulars	 that	 fall	 under	 those	 uni-
versals?”	(Sider	1992:	261).	In	the	case	of	the	views	sketched	in	4.2,	the	
situation	 is	 somewhat	analogous.	 It	 is	unclear	how	 certain	 (essential	
facts	about)	properties	not	including	natural	modalities	translate	into	
naturally	modal	facts	about	their	instances.	Of	course,	we	do	not	claim	
that	the	challenge	cannot	be	met,	but	as	long	as	it	is	not	clear	how	that	
68.	Cf.	Lewis	(1983:	366)	and	van	Fraassen	(1989:	126)	for	two	versions	of	the	in-
ference	problem	for	the	DTA	account.	Barker	and	Smart	(2012)	present	a	ver-
sion	of	it	as	a	problem	for	the	structuralist	type	of	dispositional	essentialism.
4.2.3 Structural Essence Grounding Dispositionalism
A	 third	 option	would	be	 to	 claim	 that	 first-order	 natural	modalities	
are	 grounded	 in	 essential	 (asymmetric)	 second-order	manifestation	
or	necessitation	relations	between	first-order	properties,	where	these	
second-order	relations	themselves	do	not	essentially	involve	a	natural	
modality.	On	this	view,	the	world	does	not	contain	fundamental	natu-
ral	modality,	but	its	non-modal	fundamental	metaphysical	inventory	is	
richer	than	the	mosaic	of	first-order	property	instantiations.	This	addi-
tional	higher-order	structure	between	first-order	properties	serves	as	
the	ground	of	the	natural	modalities	involving	the	bearers	of	the	thus	
connected	properties.	
Swoyer	 (1982)	might	 be	 read	 as	 advocating	 such	 a	 view.	Also,	 a	
structuralist	characterization	of	dispositional	monism	as	is	presented	
in	Bird	(2007:	138–146)	might	be	interpreted	in	that	way.66
4.2.4 Intentional Essence Grounding Dispositionalism
On	a	fourth	view,	natural	modalities	are	grounded	in	the	intentional	
nature	of	properties	(a	metaphysical	pointing	or	directedness	to	their	
manifestation	properties);67	and	the	essence	of	this	intentional	nature	
(if	it	has	an	essence)	in	turn	does	not	contain	a	natural	modality.
This	might	be	an	option	 for	 adherents	of	 “intentionalist”	disposi-
tionalism	akin	to	the	powers	view	presented	in	Molnar	(2003).
66.	One	might	 think	 that	 if	 all	natural	n-adic	 relations	whatsoever	are	disposi-
tional,	the	higher-order	relations	themselves	must	have	structural	essences	
and	 so	 structuralist	 dispositional	monism	 faces	 an	 additional	 “vertical”	 re-
gress	different	from	the	“horizontal”	regress	that	is	discussed	in	Bird	(2007:	
ch.	6).	However,	it	does	not	seem	to	be	terribly	ad hoc	to	deny	that	disposi-
tionalism	is	a	thesis	about	natural	relations	of	arbitrary	order.
67.	What	exactly	this	intentional	nature	is	is	a	much	debated	and	delicate	issue,	
since	most	dispositionalists	endorse	the	claim	Molnar	(2003:	82)	calls	“type	
independence”.	This	is	the	claim	that	a	potency	is	directed	to	its	manifestation	
property	even	if	the	latter	is	never	instantiated	in	the	entire	history	of	the	uni-
verse.	Trope-theorists	therefore	claim	that	this	directedness	is	primitive	and	
no	relation	at	all	(Martin	1997:	216),	or	at	least	not	a	genuine	relation	where	
both	 relata	 have	 to	 exist	 (Molnar	 2003:	 62).	 Platonist	 universals-theorists	
such	as	Bird	(2007)	and	Tugby	(2013),	in	contrast,	identify	this	directedness	
with	 the	holding	of	 a	 “genuine”	 (manifestation)	 relation	 to	a	possibly	non-
instantiated	manifestation	universal.
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presented	 above	 seems	 to	 be	 simply	 rejected.69	 There	 is	 no	 space	
here	to	discuss	Jacobs’	construal	of	truthmaking	in	more	detail,	but	
simply	postulating	that	(the	instantiation	of)	a	(thick)	quiddity	is	a	
truthmaker	for	a	counterfactual	(truth),	without	any	illumination	of	
how	the	quiddity	does	it,	amounts	to	giving	no	(metaphysical)	expla-
nation	at	all.70
4.2.7 Grounding-natures to the rescue?
Tugby	(2012)	presents	a	cognate	view	to	the	powerful-qualities	view	
he	calls	“qualitative	dispositional	essentialism”,	or	“QDE”	for	short.	To	
get	a	grip	on	this	variant	of	dispositional	essentialism,	it	is	worth	citing	
Tugby	(2012:	728)	at	some	length:
[W]e	could	understand	the	claim	that	quality	instances	es-
sentially	dispose	their	possessors	 towards	certain	behav-
iour	 in	 the	 following	way:	a thing’s property instantiations 
entirely constitute the truthmakers for certain counterfactuals 
true of that thing.	Schematically,	we	may	put	this	as	follows:
QDE	schema:	where	P	is	any	natural	property,	necessarily,	
if	x	has	P,	then	in	virtue	of	x’s	being	P,	if	x	were	F,	then	x 
would	be	G	(ceteris paribus).71
The	 italicized	 part	 suggests	 that	QDE	 just	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 particu-
lar	quality	 instantiations	are	 truthmakers	or	 full	 grounds	 for	 certain	
counterfactuals.	 But	 the	 following	QDE	 schema	might	 be	 read	 in	 a	
slightly	different	and	more	essentialist	way,	which	is	suggested	by	the	
69.	If	 this	general	rejection	were	 legitimate,	 it	would	also	salvage	all	 the	other	
views	sketched	 in	4.2,	as	well	as	 the	Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong	account	of	
laws	from	inference-type	problems.
70.	We	take	the	lack	of	explanatoriness	also	to	be	the	gist	of	Sider’s	(2011:	ch.	8.5)	
more	general	critique	of	truthmaker	theories.
71.	 Tugby’s	 focus	 is	on	property	 instances	 instead	of	properties.	Although	 this	
distinction	helps	 him	 to	 avoid	 a	 problem	 for	 structuralist	 dispositionalism	
presented	 in	 Barker	 and	 Smart	 (2012),	 it	 seems	 irrelevant	 for	 our	 present	
considerations.
explanatory	gap	can	be	closed,	the	(additional)	ideological	or	ontologi-
cal	“structure”	these	views	postulate	does	not	pay	off.
4.2.6 Powerful qualities
To	conclude,	we	will	briefly	examine	two	versions	of	the	brand	of	dis-
positionalism	alluded	to	in	section	4.2.2	above	that	might	evade	the	
problem	raised	in	the	last	subsection.	According	to	Jacobs’	powerful-
qualities	 view,	 “[t]he	 qualitative	 is	 identical	with	 the	 powerful;	 one	
and	the	same	thing	is	both	identical	with	a	thick	quiddity	and	a	nature	
sufficient	 to	be	 (part	of)	 the	 truthmaker	 for	 the	counterfactuals”	 (Ja-
cobs	2011:	90).
To	make	counterfactuals	true,	however,	according	to	Jacobs,	prop-
erties	do	not	need	to	have	any	modal,	structural	or	otherwise	“substan-
tial”	essence.
The	 appeal	 to	 truthmaking,	 in	 this	 case,	 is	 the	 end	 of	
the	story.	The	only	answer	to	the	question,	“Why	is	this	
quality,	 this	 thick	quiddity,	 sufficient	 to	make	 true	 this	
counterfactual?”	 is	 that	 the	 thick	 quiddity	 is	 the	 thick	
quiddity	 that	 it	 is	 (and	 not	 some	 other),	 and	 that	 the	
counterfactual	 is	 the	 counterfactual	 that	 it	 is	 (and	 not	
some	other).	The	quiddity	need	not	be	sufficient	 to	be	
the	 truthmaker	 in	virtue	of	 some	ontological	 structure	
in	 the	 quiddity	 itself.	 A	 truthmaker	 is	 not	 required	 to	
be	structured	in	the	way	the	truth	it	makes	true	is.	The	
truthmaker	can	be	a	unitary	entity,	and	is	in	the	case	of	
the	 fundamental,	natural	properties.	To	be	powerful	 is	
not	 to	have	 some	 internal	 structure,	be	 it	 relational	or	
otherwise.	(Jacobs	2011:	92)
On	this	view,	there	is	no	need	for	the	truthmaker	to	“structurally	fit”	
the	 truth	 it	makes	 true.	We	are	 left	with	no	answer	at	all	why	 it	 is	
that	the	truthmaker	is	eligible	to	make	true	the	corresponding	truth;	
and	correspondingly,	the	need	to	answer	the	inference-type	problem	
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individuated	by	(a	truthmaking	or	grounding	relation	to)	the	non-fun-
damental.74	A	possible	diagnosis	of	 this	problem	for	QDE	(a	variant	
of	which	arguably	affects	all	versions	of	dispositionalism	that	situate	
the	allegedly	grounded	modalities	 in	one	or	 another	way	 in	 the	na-
ture	of	properties)	is	that	it	“is	the	fact	to	be	grounded	that	‘points’	to	
its	grounds	and	not	the	grounds	that	point	to	what	they	may	ground”	
(Fine	2012:	76).	Thus,	 if	essences	are	utilized	to	trace	the	grounding	
relation,	it	may	be	more	promising	to	show	that	it	 lies	in	the	nature	
of	the	natural	modalities	that	they	are	grounded	in	(the	essences	of)	
certain	fundamental	properties	rather	than	vice	versa.
And	 third,	 since	QDE	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 fundamental	 fact,	 (at	 least	
ideologically)	a	very	rich	fundamental	structure	is	posited.	Therefore,	
pace	 Tugby,	 it	 seems	 doubtful	whether	QDE	 really	 “is	 a	 strikingly	
parsimonious	theory	of	the	truthmakers	for	counterfactuals”	(Tugby	
2012:	729).
5.  Conclusion
In	the	present	paper	we	have	introduced	and	motivated	a	prima facie 
highly	attractive	dispositionalist	metaphysics,	namely	ADE	(section	1),	
and	stated	several	versions	of	it	more	precisely	(section	2).	
However,	we	have	argued	that	a	natural	reading	of	ADE’s	essential-
ist	core	thesis	(MAD)	and	several	grounding	formulations	of	its	central	
explanatory	claim	(DAM)	are	 in	serious	 tension	with	each	other	(sec-
tion	3).	
In	 section	 4.1	 we	 have	 discussed	 several	 forms	 of	 dispositional-
ism	that	give	up	on	DAM	and	have	explored	what	is	left	for	them	to	
accomplish.	
In	 section	4.2	we	have	discussed	 four	ways	 to	alter	 the	essential-
ist	claim	associated	with	dispositional	essentialism	by	“de-modalizing”	
dispositionality.	However,	 if	 the	connection	between	properties	and	
natural	modalities	is	loosened	in	that	way,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	it	can	
be	reestablished.
74.	Additionally,	it	also	seems	to	violate	“purity”	(cf.	section	3.1	above).
‘necessarily’.	 Interpreting	 the	 ‘necessarily’	 as	 arising	 from	 (a	part	 of)	
the	essence	of	P,	it	seems	that	‘in	virtue	of	x’s	being	P,	if	x	were	F,	then	
x	would	be	G	(ceteris paribus)’	itself	pertains	to	the	nature	of	P	(respec-
tively	its	instantiation).72	If	this	is	correct,	natural	qualities	(respective-
ly	their	instantiations)	do	not	just	ground	certain	counterfactuals	but	
essentially	ground	these	counterfactuals,	i. e.,	the	fundamental	qualities	
have	grounding	natures.	
Ignoring	the	ceteris paribus	clause,	the	essentialist	claim	suggested	
by	Tugby’s	QDE	schema	might	accordingly	be	stated	as	Ɛ
P
	(Px → ((Fx 
□→ Gx)	is	grounded	in	Px)).73	If	we	put	this	in	a	formulation	that	is	
neutral	on	what	the	particular	natural	modality	associated	with	P	is,	
it	reads:
(QDE)	 Ɛ
P
	(Px → (NMx	is	grounded	in	Px))
QDE	obviously	has	the	advantage	over	MAD	that	it	is	compatible	with	
DAM1.	Furthermore,	prima facie	it	has	the	advantage	that	the	ground-
ing	of	the	counterfactuals	is	not	simply	a	brute	fact,	as	is	the	case	in	
Jacobs’	version	of	the	powerful-qualities	view,	but	is	essentially	tied	to	
the	essences	of	the	qualities.	However,	there	seem	to	be	at	least	three	
serious	problems	for	QDE.	
First,	postulating	that	grounding	certain	counterfactuals	pertains	to	
the	nature	of	the	fundamental	qualities	per se	does	not	seem	to	illumi-
nate	 the	 grounding	 claim	 itself.	 Instead	 of	 answering	 the	 inference-
type	problem	presented	in	4.2,	the	mystery	seems	to	be	built	into	the	
nature	of	the	fundamental	properties	instead.
Second,	 as	 already	 pointed	 out	 in	 section	 3.1	 above,	 it	 seems	 to	
be	 problematic	 to	maintain	 that	 a	 fundamental	 property	 is	 (partly)	
72.	We	do	not	claim	that	this	is	the	only	interpretation	of	QDE.	Rather,	the	pur-
pose	of	 this	 is	 to	extract	a	version	of	dispositionalism	not	examined	so	 far	
that	might	evade	the	problems	presented	above.	If	QDE	simply	is	the	claim	
that	(the	instantiations	of)	qualities	are	the	truthmakers	of	counterfactuals,	it	
collapses	to	the	powerful-qualities	views	presented	in	the	previous	section.
73.	QDE	just	is	a	semi-formal	essentialist	formulation	of	Tugby’s	QDE	schema,	in	
which	‘Ɛ
P
’	is	substituted	for	‘necessarily’	and	instead	of	the	locution	‘in	virtue	
of’,	the	expression	‘is	grounded	in’	is	used.
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